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The Emergence of Language.∗
MARK STEEDMAN
Abstract
This paper argues that the faculty of language comes essentially for free in
evolutionary terms, grace of a capacity shared with some evolutionarily quite
distantly related animals for deliberatively planning action in the world. The
reason humans have language of a kind that animals do not, is because of a
qualitative difference in the nature of human plans, rather than anything unique
to language.
1 Introduction
With admirable succinctness, Berwick and Chomsky sum up the main argu-
ments of their 2016 book Why Only Us (hereafter, WOU), as follows (p.87):
In some completely unknown way, our ancestors developed hu-
man concepts. At some time in the very recent past, apparently
sometime before 80,000 years ago, if we can judge from associ-
ated symbolic proxies, individuals in a small group of hominids
in East Africa underwent a minor biological change that provided
the operation Merge—an operation that takes human concepts as
computational atoms and yields structured expressions that, sys-
tematically interpreted by the conceptual system, provide a rich
language of thought. These processes might be computationally
perfect, or close to it, hence the result of physical laws indepen-
dent of humans. The innovation had obvious advantages, and took
over the small group. At some later stage, the internal language of
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thought was connected to the sensorimotor system, a complex task
that can be solved in many different ways and at different times. In
the course of these events, the human capacity took shape, yield-
ing a good part of our “moral and intellectual nature”, in Wal-
lace’s phrase.
There is a lot that one can agree with in the above statement. It seems en-
tirely reasonable to argue that the human languages we actually encounter have
as their evolutionary and developmental precursor a universal conceptual lan-
guage of mind whose origins lie in the need to reason about the world, rather
than in any more primitive form of communication, and that the attachment
of this language of mind to the forms of individual languages is logically sec-
ondary. As Chomsky himself has pointed out since 1965 (hereafter, Aspects),
since languages differ in structure, and the input to the child language learner
contains few markers if any of structure (the “poverty of the stimulus”), the
only plausible account of the child’s ability to learn language is that they have
access to an underlying universal representation, ultimately related to seman-
tics or a conceptual representation of the world around them.
It follows, as WOU argues elsewhere, following Lenneberg, 1967:234-239,
that we should not look for continuity in evolution between the communication
systems of animals such as birds and whales on the one hand, and language
on the other. We should rather expect that a precursor developed for some
unrelated human cognitive function has shaped the communicative apparatus
to its own ends.1
One might even also agree with WOU’s rather gnomic statement about the
language of mind being the reflection of “physical laws independent of hu-
mans”, if by that is meant that it is shaped by the way the world is (although
that world of course also includes other humans, so the aforesaid application
to communication with them is rather immediate).
The only points of disagreement with WOU that seem possible are relatively
minor. One concerns the extremely short time-span that they allocate to this
process, which they believe occurred around 100,000 years ago, or at any rate
in the “very recent past”. This claim rests, as they are careful to say in the pas-
sage quoted above, on the assumption that the emergence of durable secondary
symbolic artefacts like cave paintings and musical instruments are immediate
1Darwin, 1871:57, cited in WOU, makes the same point.
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and inevitable concomitants of the core symbolic activity of language use.
The other point of possible contention concerns the identification of the Min-
imalist Programmatic operation called Merge (Chomsky, 1995) with the cru-
cial evolutionary innovation that made this process possible. This identifica-
tion is held to follow from the claim that Minimalism is the simplest and most
explanatory theory of linguistic competence, and that its introduction there-
fore qualifies as the best candidate we have for the “minor biological change”
referred to by WOU above.
To discuss these two finer points we must begin by briefly reviewing what
is known from the paleoanthropological record concerning the evolution of
human cognition.
2 What We Know about the Evolution of Human Cognition
Human cognition and language seem very different from analogous functions
in animals. Yet humans are descended from animals via a process of evolu-
tion, sharing a common ancestor with our closest-related existing species, the
chimpanzees, only around 10 or so million years ago.
The fossil record shows that some of the earlier species on the evolutionary
line that probably led directly from that common ancestor to humans, the aus-
tralopithecines, were characterised by upright posture and bipedal locomotion
at least four million years ago, but seem otherwise to have been ape-like, par-
ticularly in terms of cranial capacity. The genus homo seems to have arisen
between 3 and 2 million years ago. It is not clear how many distinct species it
comprises, but the genus is characterised by a steady increase in cranial capac-
ity relative to body-weight across all forms until modern humans. From at least
2 million years ago, all forms have been found associated with shaped stone
tools that are not found with other genera. About 1.5 million years ago, there
was a technological refinement with the appearance of more finely-worked
tools, which coexisted with the simpler type for the next half million years.
Other evidence of technological innovation such as permanent hearths, and ev-
idence of symbolic activity such as cave-painting and musical instruments, is
much more recent, from around 100,000 years ago (Tattersall, 1995; Deacon,
1997; Lewontin, 1998).
What does the theory of evolution tell us about the ontology of human lan-
guage and cognition over this period? As Lewontin points out, very little. The
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technological advances these authors describe cannot be identified with genetic
mutation or evolutionary change. In particular, while it is reasonable to argue
that evidently symbolic activities like painting and music draw upon the same
cognitive substrate as language, it does not follow that their emergence can be
taken as a proxy or temporal marker for the emergence of language itself. For
an individual or a society to be able to support activities like drawing or mu-
sic, including preparatory activities like grinding pigments and inventing and
making flutes, requires a stable way of life with assured surpluses of the bare
necessities for life that allows such expenditure of labor. To make paintings
that have lasted for tens of thousands of years also implies the use of media for
those pigments, requiring the sacrifice of valuable materials such as fat, eggs,
and bone-marrow that could be used otherwise as food and fuel. Since suitable
mineral pigments are rare and may not be obliging enough to be to hand where
food and shelter are most plentiful, they also require time to be spent on travel
to collect them, and possibly even the development of trade networks.
There are in fact only two concrete pieces of evidence for evolutionary
events specifically related to the ontogeny of distinctively human cognition.
First, there is no parallel to even the earliest and most primitive human manu-
facture of tools in any animal, living or extinct. Many animals, including apes,
but also some of the more recently evolved birds, can solve problems requiring
tools. In particular, apes use stones as hammers and anvils, and can improvise
complicated plans to obtain out-of-reach bananas using piles of crates, sticks,
etc. (Ko¨hler, 1925). They can also modify available tools such as branches by
stripping them by hand of leaves and twigs, or bend a wire into a hook.
However, if the tools are not immediately available in the problem situation,
but are (say) in an adjacent room, then the animals have immense difficult in
solving the problem (even if they have previously seen them there). Similarly,
plans that require the use of tools such as stones to make the tool that is actually
needed, such as a blade, seem to be beyond them. Animals seem to have to
rely on whatever tools the immediate environment affords. We can conclude
that the genus homo has been cognitively quite different to other apes from the
very start.
Of course we cannot draw any conclusion about any corresponding use of
language from that fact alone. However, the second piece of evidence is more
suggestive of the presence of language. The vocal tract of modern human be-
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ings shows clear signs of an evolutionary adaptation to the production of the
very wide range of vocal gestures that characterize human speech, as opposed
to chimpanzee vocalization. (This evolutionary adaptation has been so rapisd
and extreme as to leave adult humans alone among animals in not being able
to swallow and breath at the same time, a change that would otherwise seem
to be maladaptive, since it can cause them to die prematurely bychoking on
food.) The adaptation in question involves a number of anatomical changes
that allow the vocal tract to lengthen by lowering the larynx. Phil Lieberman
and colleagues (Lieberman et al., 1992; Lieberman and McCarthy, 2007) have
shown from fossil evidence that over at least the last 2 million years of human
evolution, including at least the development of the erectus and later nean-
derthalis forms, there has been a steady process of lengthening of the vocal
tract and lowering of the larynx in homo.
There are other possible biological explanations for lengthening in animal
vocal tracts. Fitch and Reby (2001) have argued convincingly that the larynx
is descended in male red deer, as an adaptation with the function of attracting
mates by exaggerating the impression of male physical size. Fitch goes on
to suggest that the lowering of the human larynx noted by Lieberman had a
similar evolutionary function, and has only recently been recruited to linguistic
purposes. It is of course perfectly possible that our ancesters went through a
laryngeal arms-race of this kind, though it is odd that it should have applied
equally to males and females, and that neither modern humans nor extant apes
of other genera seem to seek reproductive success in anything like this way.
It seems at least as likely, as Deacon argues (1997:354-365), that the changes
that Lieberman describes reflect the presence of an essentially fully human lan-
guage, but that its original medium was primarily gestural, and only gradually
recruited and adapted the vocal apparatus (because of its superior properties
when communicating around corners or in the dark), by incremental lowering
of the larynx to the point where the role of gesture became minor.2
Under such assumptions, we would seek a single evolutionary event that
would support both the ability to make plans requiring the manufacture of
situationally non-afforded tools and support the use of language.
Such an evolutionary innovation is not hard to imagine: making a plan to
2See Bolhuis et al. (2014) and related exchange for a contrary view on the countervailing advantage
of this evolutionary development.
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skin a quarry with a yet-to-exist knife seems logically quite similar to making
a plan to get someone else who is not yet involved to cooperate in the same
activity (Steedman, 2002; Steedman and Petrick, 2007). The only question
seems to be which of the two capabilities carried a direct evolutionarily selec-
tional advantage that allowed the other to piggyback upon it. Since evolution
is generally characterized by the recombination of previously independently
evolved mechanisms, and we know of other related instances of cooperation
among primates such as tamarins (Hrdy, 2007), it seems most likely that it is
the human faculty for cooperative action that was actively selected, rather than
tool manufacture as such.
One concrete example of such cooperation for which the evolutionary popu-
lation dynamics has been quite thoroughly explored (Hamilton, 1964) has been
suggested by Fitch (2007); Burkart et al. (2009); Hrdy (2009) to be coopera-
tive child-rearing, the evolutionary pressure for which may in turn stem from
selection for a further characteristic of human evolution, namely neoteny, or a
prolonged period of infant development (Haldane, 1932).
Both human tool use and human communication would then be a simple
extension of non-human cognition to planning using conceptual knowledge of
actions involving non-self agencies.3
Lewontin argues forcefully that these are questions to which we cannot
know the answer, because the evidence is simply not there, a point which WOU
repeatedly endorse.
However, in such a situation it is standard to apeal to Ockham’s Razor. A
theory in which there is one evolutionary event that might be related both to
the human conception of the world and to human language, of a kind that has
been seen elsewhere in the nearby evolutionary landcape, might be prefered on
grounds of simplicity to one in which the same evolutionary endpoint requires
two unrelated evolutionary events, one for the development of human concepts
and one that is claimed to be entirely specific to language.
Interestingly, WOU’s argument for the second of these evolutionary events
is of exactly this kind, based on parsimony. They argue that because the Mini-
malist theory defines human language in terms of a single primitive operation
Merge, it places the least burden on the theory of evolution to come up with it.
3This possibility does not conflict with WOU’s assumption that a language of mind representing
the way the world works is logically prior to its use for communication. It merely allows that some
of that cognitive substrate for humans is social, as Tomasello (1999) has argued.
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3 The Emergence of Merge
Merge is defined by Chomsky (2001/2004) and WOU as a composite of two
operations, External Merge and Internal Merge. External Merge is simply the
formation of a structure, say [NP,VP] from two elements NP and VP. (Thus,
external merge is closely related to the notion of a context-free phrase-structure
rule such as S→ NP VP. The technical difference need not detain us.) In se-
mantic terms, External Merge is similarly simple: one of the elements NP and
VP is a predicate (or more generally, a function), and the other is an argument.
The structure can then be interpreted as the application of the function to the
argument. (For example, we might think of the VP as a function such as walks
that applies to people like gilbert to yield propositions like walks(gilbert), the
meaning of “Gilbert walks” in the Language of Mind. Less intuitively, we
could think of “Gilbert” as denoting a higher-order function, applying to the
same function walks, to yield the same result.)
The other component, Internal Merge, is very different in character. It used
to be called Move, because it corresponds to the phenomenon of “displace-
ment” in natural language, where elements that belong together at the level of
meaning as function and argument are separated in the sentence, as book and
reading are in which book is Gilbert reading?.
The authors (WOU:175,n.9) deny that any difference or “natural break” ex-
ists between internal and external merge, pointing out that “the simplest wh-
question [like the above], which is still context-free, invokes the internal ver-
sion of Merge.” However, that just means that for such simple wh-questions,
there is, as Gazdar (1981) showed, an alternative entirely context-free analysis
in terms of External Merge alone. They cannot intend to argue that Internal
Merge in general actually is interpreted as a kind of GPSG-style hypercyclic
recursive application of context-free External Merge, because in the general
case, Internal Merge, unlike External Merge, generates constructions that are
not context-free. Perhaps they are thinking of the related more expressive
feature-passing mechanism of HPSG, as has been proposed recently by Neele-
man and van de Koot (2010). In any case, something more than application
seems to be needed.
Semantically, Internal Merge corresponds to the operation of abstraction,
or formation of a new function from a proposition, using a variable, say x, in
place of an argument somewhere in it, and designating x as the argument of the
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new function. Thus, Which book is Gilbert reading is turned into something
like the property “book x such that Gilbert is reading x” (cf. WOU:100.
A theory which consisted only of the two rules Apply and Abstract would be
a completely general applicative system, and would be very expressive indeed.
In the absence of any specifics about how Internal Merge is implemented (in
particular, the implicit copying process that it assumes), it is not clear in what
sense its evolutionary introduction can be claimed to be “minor”, as in the
quotation from WOU with which we began.)
WOU goes to considerable lengths to defend the Merge theory against the
suspicion that this kind of all-in-one appearance of a fully-formed otherwise
unprecedented innovation is not the way that evolution usually works. It is
well-known that the speed of evolutionary change is non-uniform: the fossil
record consists of long periods of equilibrium where nothing much changes,
punctuated by periods of very rapid change where new species suddenly appear
and old ones equally suddenly vanish.
This phenomenon, sometimes referred to as “saltation”, is widely under-
stood as arising via a number of mechanisms. If the environment is unchang-
ing, then the effect of natural selection is to actively limit drift away from the
local optimum it has reached so far. But if the environment changes drastically,
then the old optimum is likely to be optimal no longer, and variation, especially
if accelerated and distributed over a group by sex, is selected positively rather
than negatively. (This is the pattern in the great extinctions, such as the one
that led to the elimination of the dinosaurs and the rise of the mammals.)
Another mechanism is re-use of previously evolved structures as macro-
instructions. The development of segmented creatures such as modern milli-
pedes seems to treat the segment as a macro.
Another powerful mechanism is symbiosis (Margulis, 1981; Dyson, 1985),
whereby two autonomous organisms merge, to their mutual evolutionary ben-
efit. The incorporation of algal cells in primitive eukaryotes to form the mito-
chondria and chloroplasts seen in the cells of every animal and plant was an
event of this kind. This process also seems to have played a part in the even
earlier rapid evolution of the primitive eukaryotes, or cells with nucleii, formed
by the symbiosis of a bacterium with an archeal host cell. (Lane, 2015). A still
more primitive version of this process is the direct incorporation of genetic
material from one organism into the genome of another, known as lateral gene
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transfer, as is common among bacteria.
However, despite the availability of these various mechanisms for acceler-
ated evolution, biologists feel it incumbent upon them to show how develop-
ments for which they are invoked could have taken place in the time period
defined by the fossil record and from known or inferrable precursors. For ex-
ample, Lane, 2015:194 says of the eukaryotic development:
To suggest that the nucleus, for example, somehow just popped
into existence is to confound genetic saltation with adaptation.
The nucleus is an exquisitely adapted structure, . . . the product
of natural selection acting over extended periods of time, [in] a
purely Darwinian process. But that does not mean it had to hap-
pen slowly in geological terms.
Lane devotes the rest of his book telling us exactly how this could have hap-
pened in the known time period, and whether it only happened once, or may
have happened repeatedly..
WOU energetically invokes the notion of saltation as a justification for iden-
tifying Merge as a unitary mutation, following Berwick (1997), and citing Lane
in support, However, it does not explain how this remarkable event could hap-
pen in evolutionary terms.4
WOU attempts to deal with this difficulty by defining Minimalism, quite cor-
rectly, as a “Theory of the Computation”, in the sense of Marr (1977, 1982),
who defines three levels of representation at which a computation can be de-
fined: the Theory, the Algorithm, and the Machine.5
The universe in which an organism evolves may be such that computing a
certain function, such as the Fourier Transform, or an applicative system, may
help it survive and multiply. In that sense, the Theory of that Computation
4WOU repeatedly cites Lenneberg (1967) in this connection, in support of discontinuity in the evo-
lutionary record. However, Lenneberg’s concern (1967:227-239) seems to have been exclusively
with evolutionary non-continuity of human language with animal communication systems.
5Marr uses the example of the Fourier Transform, which among other things can be applied to
decompose complex waveforms into the sum of a number of simple frequency components, to
illustrate the three levels of analysis. The Theory of the Computation is the most abstract level of
description, which in the case of the Fourier Transform is a mathematical equation. The second
level is that of the algorithm, where there are several quite different methods for actually computing
the function so defined, including the Fast Fourier Transform, and optical methods. The last of
Marr’s levels is the machine on which the algorithm is implemented, which again varies along
dimensions such as digital, analog, neural and so on, and which may determine the choice of
algorithm.
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may be thought of as a ghost in the evolutionary machine. (For example, the
world we live in makes vision so advantageous that the lens-based cameral eye
has been independently evolved via quite different routes in vertebrates and
cephalopods.)
However, as Johnson (2016) points out, the theory of the computation it-
self can play no direct part in the evolutionary process, since it is just what
is “out there”, an invisible hand determining fitness, as yet with no internal
representation in the organism.
Evolution by natural selection has to work at the level of the somatic ma-
chine and the algorithm, by a process of generating variations on whatever
representations are already implicit in the organisms’s existing genetic code.
Among the other mechanisms of saltation mentioned earlier, these variations
can be at the level of structures or macro-instructions rather than codons, so
they can induce large phenotypic changes.6
Even if we accept that Merge is a unitary rule, and that as such it consti-
tutes the simplest Theory of the Computation for human linguistic competence
(which would require us to also take into consideration all the constraints and
minimality conditions that limit its application), that theory itself tells us very
little about the specific solution that evolution has been able to reach in order
to actually compute that function.
In particular, it does not follow that the simplest evolutionary route to im-
6WOU:175-6,n.9 accuses Steedman, 2014 of of describing the process of evolution as consisting in
complete search of all possible codable sequences, citing a remark there that evolution “essentially
works by trying every possible variation on every viable variation so far”. The authors seem to
have missed the words “possible”, “viable” and “so far”, together with a footnote saying “It is a
little more complex than this. Even genomes must be structured programs, and even evolution
needs the occasional mass-extinction to escape overfitting.”
Of course, the fact that all stages of evolutionary development must be viable, places stringent
limita on the solutions that are reachable. My point was that, within those limits, the search can
be exhaustive, since the number of variations generated, most of which are lethal, is essentially
unlimited, and can find extremely singular solutions. For example, the genetic code itself, consist-
ing of 64 triplets of two base-pairs encoding the 20 amino acids that make up all proteins found
in terrestrial life is a near-optimally efficient outlier for its function of reliable transmission of
the genome (Freeland and Hurst, 1998; Freeland et al., 2000; see Morris, 2004:17-19; Di Giulio,
2005).
WOU:175 also suggests that Steedman, 2014 claims that “[evolution] has solved the acquisition
problem offline”, whatever that could mean. However, it is quite clear from the passage the authors
quote that it contrasts the capability of evolution to develop the language of mind that Berwick
and Chomsky themselves assume with language acquisition in the child, where the poverty of the
language stimulus means that the child must have prior access to it.
See Kwiatkowski et al. (2012) and Abend et al. (2017) for a fully on-line algorithmic model of
child language acquisition of the kind that my colleagues and I actually advocate.
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plementation of the theory involves a correspondingly unitary mechanism, or
even a monolithic rule of internal merger as such. If a number of components,
such as the composition and type-raising operators of Combinatory Categorial
Grammar (CCG, Steedman, 2000), independently-evolved for other reasons,
can be combined to achieve the same result, then they may offer a shorter
route (or even the only accessible one).
This is often the way discontinuity in evolution works: for example, insect
wings and feaathers are thought to have originally evolved with thermoregula-
tory functions, before the physics that was “out there”variaously afforded their
use in flight. The following section proposes a way that composition and type-
raising could have evolved separately for quite different functions, only later
to be co-opted by language.
4 Plans and the Structure of Behavior
It is in fact quite likely that an operation like composition should have been
independently evolved for other reasons before being co-opted by the nascent
language faculty. Chimpanzees can, as was noted earlier, make elaborate plans
involving tools, for example, placing a box under otherwise inaccessible ba-
nanas, and continue to stack boxes, until climbing the stack allows access to
the bananas.
Actions like stacking a box on something and climbing on it are functions
that map states of the world into other states of the world. Imagining taking
one such action in a given state is application of that function to that state.
Thus, any animal that can do that much has External Merge.7
A plan like placing boxes on boxes until climbing on them allows you to
obtain the bananas is also a function mapping states onto other states, but to
imagine this composite function you have to mentally compose elementary
actions of stacking boxes until climbing will get you high enough. Only then
can you know that executing the plan will result in a state where you have the
bananas. Thus, composition already does some of the work of abstraction, and
hence of Internal Merge.
Similarly, your chances of actually finding such a plan, given that there is
7In fact, it isn’t clear that you can do anything we would want to call thinking—that is, anything
deliberative, going beyond purely reactive reflex action—without function application. (In par-
ticular, you obviously can’t apply operators such as abstraction or Copy/Internal Merge without
application/External Merge, as Brody (1995) and Nunes (2004) point out.)
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a potentially very large number of mostly irrelevant or impossible actions you
could consider in this planning process, will be enhanced if you organize your
knowledge of actions around the objects that afford those actions. That way,
if there are boxes around, you think about plans involving actions of stacking
and climbing, whereas if there are sticks you think about those involving hit-
ting and poking. The replacement of an object by a function over the actions
that it affords into their results is closely akin to the operation of type-raising.
Type raising and composition alone are known to support a restrcited form of
applicative system (Smullyan, 1985). Thus, it is also reasonable to think that
the ape language of mind may include type-raising, as well as composition. If
so apes already have some elementary operations of an applicative system of
the kind we see in language, and hence some direct precursors of Merge.
Not surprisingly, since apes nevertheless do not evince human language, the
language of mind that is implicit in such ape plans still lacks many character-
istics of the precursor to human language that WOU envisages in the passage
which this paper began by quoting. The language of plans is essentially a
finite-state language of “while-loops”, of the kind Piaget (1936) called “circu-
lar reactions” and Miller et al. (1960) called “TOTE Units”.
Nevertheless, this finite-state language of plans already has what WOU:1
calls the “Basic Property” of linguistic competence, which they define as “a
finite computational system yielding an infinity of expressions, each of which
has a definite interpretation in semantic-pragmatic and sensory-motor sys-
tems”, since the number of plans that can be expressed in it and executed is
in principle unbounded.
It is presumably this chimpanzee language of mind to which sign systems
like the one taught to Washoe by Gardner and Gardner (1969), and even some
communicative gestures native to chimpanzees, attach. (Such sign systems are
heavily oriented towards actions and action sequences McNeill, 1980:148.)
However, the expressive limitations on such communicative systems and
differences from human language use (Premack and Premack, 1983; Premack,
1986) are well-known. Apes’ use of sign language should therefore be seen
as evidence that if you have a language of mind of any kind, then a sensory-
motor communicative system of some sort can be attached to it, rather than
as constituting an evolutionary precursor to human language in its own right,
of the kind proposed by Bickerton (1992), Jackendoff (1999), and Progovac
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(2014, 2015).
Nevertheless it is worth noticing that in order to arrive at the piling and
climbing plan, the ape has to carry out a search through a tree of possible
future states, since each state typically permits more than one action. Such
search requires something equivalent to a stack machine or push-down au-
tomaton (PDA) (actually, since memory is in fact bounded, a simulation of
such a machine), to keep track of the actions that remain to be explored in each
state reached by each possible action.8
Whatever the evolutionary pressure was for human social collaboration, it
requires a different kind of planning ability. Preparing food may require find-
ing somebody who is willing to mind the baby. But that willingness doesn’t
exist: you need to cause it to come into being. You may need to go and find
somebody who will commit to it. Moreover, in order to do that, you need to
be able to imagine that if someone would do so, whoever it was, you would be
able to get on with dinner (cf. Hamburger and Crain, 1987).
This kind of planning already goes beyond chimpanzee planning abilities. It
is parallel to seeing that, if you had a box or two, you could reach the banana,
and making a plan to first obtain the boxes, a problem at which we have noted
apes generally fail. It is also the kind of planning involved in recognising that,
if one made a knife, one one would be able to skin the animal with that cur-
rently nonexistent knife, (or conversely, that if you make a knife first, someone
will be able to skin a yet-to-be-obtained animal).
This kind of planning is well-known in the AI literature as “planning with
variables” (Etzioni et al., 1992; Petrick and Bacchus, 2002). If I want to visit
you, and I don’t know where you live, then a very bad plan is to start knocking
on doors until the person who answers is you. A better plan involves the use of
a variable we might call address, making a plan to set address to your address
(say by looking it up in my address book) and then going to address, wherever
8A related point is made by Hauser et al. (2002):1578. Of course, to describe this mechanism as a
PDA is to define it at the level of the theory of the computation. The simulation may of course be in
terms of counters, dynamic programming, etc. etc., using whatever machinery is available. Thus,
this proposal does not constitute “evolutionary incremental ‘tweaking’ of a stack-like architecture”
as WOU:175,n.9, suggests concerning the related proposal in Steedman, 2014. Nor is it the case,
as WOU:131-2 rather bizarrely argues, that because ants have memory and therefore embody a
machine of a type that could be used to simulate a Turing machine to some approximation, that
ants therefore already embody the endpoint of such evolutionary tinkering. Clearly, the issue is
not what can in principle be simulated with an FSM, but what actually is being computed by ants,
apes, and people, and how evolution has worked to make their computations rather different.
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that is, and knocking on the door there.
Planning with variables allows you to make more complicated plans, such
as finding some kid who will find an adult who will mind the baby, involving
multiple agents. Making these plans also require graph-search, in this case for
a situation where you are free to get on with dinner. Such search again requires
simulation of a recursive process of function composition with a push-down
automaton.
However, the language of human plans has more structure than in the ape
case. As far as the theory of the computation goes, it is a language with an
unbounded number of constituent types, since its elements can in principle be
functions over arbitrary numbers of individuals. It is therefore a language of
greater expressivity than context-free.
Interestingly, constituents of just this multi-valent character can be seen mir-
rored in the verbal clusters of verb-final languages like Dutch and Zurich Ger-
man, that were used to provide the first formal proofs of the trans- context-free
expressivity of human grammars (Huybregts, 1984; Shieber, 1985). (In such
languages, the plan that in English is expressed as “get some kid to find an
adult to mind the baby” is glossed with the order “some kid an adult the baby
[get find mind]”, with the verb cluster homomorphic to a plan involving three
plan variables.)
It therefore seems reasonable to speculate that the crucial evolutionary event
leading to human language was a shift to a way of life requiring the general-
ization of the prehuman ability for composing sequences of elementary actions
into plans to the ability to do so for plans involving multiple agents. This abil-
ity constituted a language of mind capable of supporting human language.
If so, we might tell a slightly different story from the quotation from WOU
with which we began, which might go as follows:
In some unknown way, but in a development with known parallels
in other evolutionarily unrelated lineages, our non-human pri-
mate ancestors developed the capacity for deliberative planning
of sequential action, requiring search through hypothetical state
spaces, using sequential operators of merger such as application
and composition of actions/functions representing state-change,
sometimes afforded by tools that the current situation includes, of
a kind we see other animals, including their non-human descen-
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dants, applying today, constituting structured symbolic plans.
More recently, somewhere between 2 and 3 million years ago,
in some equally unknown way, the human line became distin-
guished by access to a new kind of cooperative action concept,
requiring planning with variables representing non-present agents
and resources, constituting a good part of our moral and intellec-
tual nature.
The language of mind that was implicit in such plans logi-
cally preceded but immediately supported connection to the sen-
sory motor system to form communicative languages, a task which
can be solved in many different ways and at different times, and
was initially heavily gestural.
We can have no direct evidence for the form of such languages,
but we have no reason not to suppose them to have had all the
characteristics of full human language. The same development in
planning ability also immediately supported the manufacture of
tools.
After a long period during which the only strictly linguistic
evolutionary development consisted in continuous adaptation of
the vocal tract to the advantageous medium of vocal speech, the
human lineage got lucky enough for long enough to apply the
planning abilities that were already supporting language and tool
manufacture to the development of more sedentary ways of life,
supported by larger groups and resources like leisure, trade and
agriculture, eventually allowing the emergence of less evanescent
symbolic practices related to language, including painting and
music.
But that is just another story, and, as Lewontin, 1998:129-130 wisely (and
somewhat testily) reminds us, concerning the evolution of human cognition,
“there is no end to plausible storytelling.”
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